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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GEORGE EDWARD HARGRAVES,

:

Case No. 890684-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to two
second degree felonies in the Second District Court.

This Court

has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err by ruling that the search

of defendant's vehicle was justified by voluntary consent that
was not obtained by exploitation of an allegedly illegal
detention?

On appeal, a correction of error standard is applied

to the trial court's legal conclusions.

State v. Johnson, 771

P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah

1989) (citing Oates v. Chavez, 7490 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. IVt
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990); and
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to
distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990).

Defendant moved to suppress

the evidence before the Honorable David E. Roth, Second District
Court Judge.

Judge Roth denied the motion and defendant entered

a conditional guilty plea (T2. 20).

Judge Roth reduced count

two to a second degree felony and sentenced defendant to two
terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 49,
50).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 27, 1989, Highway Patrol Trooper Spiegel
2
was traveling south on Harrison Blvd. in Ogden (T. 6).
Defendant and a female companion were also traveling South on
Harrison Blvd. after pulling out of a gas station (T. 7, 42).
They appeared nervous when they noticed Trooper Spiegel driving
behind them (T. 8). Defendant looked back at Spiegel two or
three times (T. 9). Spiegel called to check the vehicle plates
through NCIC at 12:54 p.m. and found that the vehicle was not
reported stolen (T. 10). Because Spiegel noticed during the time
he was following the car that the windshield was cracked, Spiegel
T2 is the transcript containing the hearings of April
19, 1989 and April 24, 1989.
2
T is the transcript containing the hearings of April
7, 1989 and April 14, 1989.

stopped them at 12:56 p.m. (T. 11, 15, 33-34).
When Spiegel asked the driver, Shelly Hall, for her
license and vehicle registration, she stated that her license was
buried inside her suitcase in the trunk and handed him the
registration (T. 18, 44). After a short conversation with
defendant, Hall told Spiegel that she had lost her driver's
license (T. 18, 44). At that point, Spiegel called for backup
(T. 18). Trooper Kodele arrived seven minutes after Spiegel
stopped the vehicle (T. 15). Another trooper, Home, arrived
sometime after Kodele but before 1:30 p.m. (T. 16).
An NCIC check revealed that Hall was wanted in Oregon
on a dangerous drug violation (T. 32). Hall was arrested because
of the outstanding warrant (T. 33). Spiegel also issued a "fixit" citation for the broken windshield (T. 32).
The troopers also discovered that the Texas
registration presented to them was for a vehicle other than the
one that the plates were attached to (T. 25). They checked with
Texas to discover the explanation for the discrepancy and would
not have allowed defendant to leave the scene until the problem
was cleared up (T. 25).
During the time that defendant and Hall were detained
at the scene, Trooper Spiegel asked defendant about three times
what it was that he did not want the officers to see inside the
3
trunk (T. 17, 45).
Defendant said there was nothing there,
offered Spiegel his keys and told him to look inside (T. 17, 72).
3
The trial court could not determine whether defendant
was in custody during this time and, thus, assumed that he was in
custody in deciding whether to suppress the evidence (T2. 7).

Spiegel looked inside the trunk but had found nothing when other
officers arrived on the scene (T. 24).
When Sgt. Bush arrived at 1:30 p.m. while Spiegel was
looking through the trunk, he suggested that they obtain a
written consent from defendant for the search (T. 24, 29, 102).
Bush instructed Spiegel, in defendant's presence, to stop
searching until defendant signed the form (T. 29, 102, 106).
Bush turned to defendant and asked if defendant would sign the
form (T. 30). Defendant agreed to sign it (T. 30). While they
were filling out the form, defendant told Bush that he was on
probation for a drug violation in Oregon (T. 30). Defendant
signed the written consent form (T. 67, 113). Discovered in the
vehicle was approximately one pound of cocaine and over twenty
pounds of marijuana hidden in the back of the front seat.
Prior to his arrest for possession of the drugs,
defendant told the officers he was diabetic (T. 19, 111). After
he was arrested, defendant said he was going into shock and
needed to take his insulin shot (T. 19, 31, 156). He told Bush
that the shot was due at 3:30 p.m. (T. 113). Paramedics were
called to the scene and they arrived at 2:42 p.m. (T. 124).
Defendant told them he needed his insulin at 3:00 p.m. (T. 125).
They tested defendant's blood sugar and found the level to be 175
which is high-normal for a diabetic (T. 127-28).

Defendant

scored a 15, the highest score, on the Glasgow Coma Scale which
meant he was well-oriented (T. 129). The paramedics recommended
transporting defendant to the hospital for evaluation since they
do not administer insulin and it was nearly time for defendant's

injection (T. 126, 131). The emergency room physician found
defendant's claim of insulin shock contradictory to his request
for an injection (T. 138). Insulin shock indicates there is too
much insulin in the body and a person experiencing this would not
want more insulin (T. 138).
The hospital reading of defendant's blood sugar level
was 46 —

lower than the normal range of 80-120 (R. 139-41).

Blood sugar levels can drop precipitously (T. 142). Defendant
administered insulin to himself about 15 minutes before his blood
was drawn for the glucose test (T. 159-60).
Defendant claimed that at the time he consented to the
search, 1:30 p.m., he was experiencing insulin shock and was
disoriented and confused (T. 53-55, 56). The officers, paramedic
and doctor who observed defendant all felt that he appeared
normal, not confused (T. 73, 77, 79-80, 81-82, 83, 106, 125, 128,
132, 138, 142-48, 157-59, 164). Based upon this testimony, the
court found defendant was coherent, lucid and articulate at the
time of his consent (T2. 9). Judge Roth went on to find that
defendant's consent was voluntary (T2. 10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Regardless of whether there was an unlawful stop of
defendant's vehicle, the search in this case was justified by
defendant's verbal and written consent.
claim, his consent was voluntary.

Contrary to defendant's

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH
Defendant asserts that the judge erred in finding that
he voluntarily consented to the search of his car.

On appeal of

a suppression ruling, this Court applies a correction of error
standard to the trial court's conclusions of law.

State v.

Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,
P.2d

(Utah 1989) (citing Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659

(Utah 1988)).

The clearly erroneous standard of Utah R. Civ. P.

52(a) is applied to the judge's findings of fact.
Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Utah 1990).

State v.

Defendant does

not challenge the court's findings of fact, rather, he challenges
the court's legal conclusion that the consent was voluntary.

As

defendant points out, the trial court did not determine whether
the initial stop of defendant was pretextual because the court
viewed consent as the only issue (T. 165, 169-70).

Thus, this

Court need not decide whether the initial stop was pretextual.
Warrantless searches that are not justified by some
recognized exception the warrant requirement are per se
unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.
137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah June 28, 1990).

State v. Arroyo,
One exception to

the warrant requirement is voluntary consent. j[d. The State
bears the burden to prove that consent was voluntary.

Id.

Voluntary consent to search following a pretextual stop
renders evidence discovered in the search admissible so long as
the consent was not produced by police exploitation of the

pretextual stop.

Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.

In this

case, the trial court ruled that defendant voluntarily consented
to the search of his car.

Defendant does not claim on appeal

that there was exploitation of any primary illegality, he simply
asserts that the court erred in finding that the consent was
voluntary.
Judge Roth's conclusion that defendant consented
voluntarily was supported by overwhelming evidence from the
officers at the scene.

Defendant argued that his consent was

involuntary because he was confused as the result of insulin
shock.

However, all of the officers who testified indicated that

defendant appeared normal to them (T. 73, 77, 79-80, 81-82, 83,
106, 157-59, 164). The paramedic who responded to the scene when
defendant said he was experiencing insulin shock found that
defendant appeared normal and scored the highest possible score
on a test designed to determine his degree of alertness (T. 125,
128, 129, 132, 138). The emergency room doctor who examined
defendant stated that defendant seemed normal and not generally
confused (T. 142, 144, 145).
Furthermore, the circumstances of the stop itself were
not coercive as defendant claimed.

There were four officers

present at the time defendant was asked to sign the written
consent form at 1:30 (T. 24). Defendant stated there were only
three officers there (T. 67). One of the officers was seated in
a patrol car with defendant's companion who had been arrested on
a warrant out of Oregon (T. 27, 79). They did not surround
defendant or tell him that he must sign the consent form (T. 30,

79-81, 107, 154). Defendant was not handcuffed or restrained (T.
108).

There was no show of force (T. 110). When defendant

requested a Seven-Up from his car because of his dry mouth
associated with diabetes, it was given to him (T. 31, 111-12).
When defendant asked for his coat from the car, it was given to
him (T. 111). Based upon this evidence, Judge Roth was justified
in finding that defendant's consent was voluntary under the test
articulated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and
relied upon by defendant.

There was clear and positive testimony

that the consent was voluntary and given without duress or
coercion, express or implied.

Consequently, the court correctly

refused to suppress the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/

day of August, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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